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Abstract
Many economies, particularly emerging or transition economies lack institu-
tional arrangements (like ISO certiﬁcation) to credibly signal product quality.
The absence of such institutions leads to low levels of market activity with
poor quality products on sale. In this paper, we use a dynamic framework with
asymmetric information to model this phenomenon. Sellers choose the quality
they produce and face a trade-oﬀ between producing a high quality product,
which gives low one period returns but leads to higher future proﬁts, and a
low quality product, which gives higher one period returns but bars the seller
from future market activity. Sellers’ diﬀer in how they discount the future
and thus in how they evaluate this trade-oﬀ. Demand is endogenous and the
number of buyers that enter the market depends on the quality of the products
they expect to ﬁnd. Market thickness (the buyer-seller ratio), product quality,
prices and the distribution of seller types are all endogenously determined and
multiple steady states may emerge. In general, a suﬃcient number of sellers
need to be patient for multiple steady states to exist. Technology that involves
‘learning by doing’ may cause market segregation. Importantly, sellers’ expec-
tations about market thickness matter in determining the quality only if sellers
believe that market thickness will be less than one.
JEL classiﬁcation: L14, L15, O12, O17.
Keywords: market thickness, endogenous quality, multiple equilibria, price
mechanism.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we provide an explanation for the wide variation in product quality
and demand across economies (or markets) facing similar constraints in that quality
of a product is not veriﬁable before consumption1 and there are no institutional
arrangements (like ISO certiﬁcation) to provide credible signals. The basic idea is as
follows: investment in quality is costly and thus worthwhile only when present and
future demand for the product is expected to be high, while demand itself depends
on the expected quality. Thus, if investment in high quality goods gives low present
returns, such investment will be undertaken only if investors (or ﬁrms) have optimistic
expectations about future market activity. Therefore, in the absence of an ex ante co
ordinating arrangement, an economy may fall into a low quality, low demand steady
state.
This is a scenario typically faced by developing, emerging and transition economies
where buyers face uncertainty about the quality of the products they buy in the
marketplace and sellers face uncertainty about their present and future prospects
in the market. Information in these economies about past market transactions is
limited and exchange in the anonymous market place is potentially risky. In Russia
and other transition economies, (see McMillan (1997), for instance, which discusses
speciﬁc examples) it is reported that people get cheated if they buy from anonymous
sellers, which is why very few people do. Since sellers have low expectations about
meeting buyers in the market they ﬁnd it optimal to cheat when they ﬁnd a buyer,
justifying the buyers’ fears about transacting in the market. Thus, the economy may
be caught in a vicious circle of expectations, which are self fulﬁlling, even though
there may be nothing in the preferences of agents and the technology available to
prevent the market from being very active with high quality products being sold. In
such a scenario there is scope for intelligent policy intervention, which, by changing
expectations, can take the economy from low levels of trade in the marketplace to
high levels of self sustaining market activity.
Of course, this scenario is not conﬁned to underdeveloped countries. The internet
whose growing volume of trade is now widely acknowledged2 faces this quality un-
certainty problem as well, which in turn aﬀects demand. As a recent article in The
New York Times (see References) pointed out ‘fraud had become a problem since the
ﬁrst online auctions...and auction fraud is now the most prevalent computer- related
crime, according to the Internet Fraud Complaint Center.’ This aﬀects buyers as well.
The report mentions reactions of buyers to this quality uncertainty saying that this
aﬀects their future entry in online transactions. Interestingly, in view of the model
speciﬁcation we adopt in this paper, there seems to be some evidence (see Resnick
and Zeckhauser (2001)) from eBay that buyers place much less credence on positive
1In other words this is the market for what is commonly called an ‘experience good’.
2Neuman and Medvinsky (1997) note the dramatic growth of users and organizations reachable
on the net in the last couple of years.
2messages than on negative ones. Resnick and Zeckhauser’s data suggests that prices
and probability of trade do not depend signiﬁcantly on the number of positive mes-
sages received about a seller. However, negative messages seem to matter, and the
extreme negative message is a prosecution for fraud. The auction site eBay reports,
according to Resnick and Zeckhauser, a small proportion of ‘problem’ trades. Other,
less well-known, internet sites might be more prone to such problems. Presumably,
the expectation that there will be relatively few problems on eBay is self-fulﬁlling (at
least, this is what this paper will argue).
A few more illustrations about the type of markets which approximate our envi-
ronment will help us ﬁx ideas. Since we get multiple steady states with some involving
high market activity some fairly “thick” markets in developed economies also share
features of our model. An example which readily comes to mind is that of phone cards
which oﬀe rt h es a m en u m b e ro fm i n u t e sp e rd o l l a rb u to f t e nh a v ed i ﬀering quality.
Again, travel agents oﬀering the same price for air tickets and hotel bookings often
end up providing diﬀerent quality products-some indulge in outright cheating while
others provide less facilities than advertised. The same can be said for the quality
of service at various hotels as well as the food served in diﬀerent restaurants whose
menucards read alike. This is even more widely seen in the service sector (the large
casual labor market for instance) where typically a fair amount of variation is seen
in quality, which cannot be inferred from the prices being asked
1.1 Informal description of the model
To analyze this problem we develop a model of two sided asymmetric information
to show how expectations about the quality of a product (good or service) induce
a certain level of market thickness3 (by which we mean the relative abundance of
buyers to sellers), which in turn induces a certain average level of quality. Market
thickness deﬁned in this way is used to measure market activity.4
More speciﬁcally, buyers face uncertainty about the quality of the product they
purchase and do not know the time preferences (discount factors) of individual sellers.
Sellers face uncertainty about the valuations that buyers place on the quality of their
products. Given the uncertainty that buyers face about quality, they may not ﬁnd
it optimal to purchase the product, while sellers facing this demand uncertainty may
not ﬁnd it worthwhile to invest in production of high quality products. Thus, multiple
steady states may emerge -some involving low quality and low market thickness and
some involving high quality and high market thickness.
3Thus demand is endogenous unlike most models dealing with how demand can aﬀect product
quality (see Rogerson (1982), for example).
4This distinction is worth noting as the term ‘market thickness’ has been used diﬀerently by
diﬀerent people in the literature. (See McLaren (2000) who, in the introduction, discusses the
diﬀerent uses this term has in the literature.
3We use a random matching technology to describe the meeting between buyers
and sellers such that each seller meets the same expected number of buyers. As the
survival of sellers in the market depends on the quality they produce (with high quality
sellers surviving longer than low quality ones) we model the population dynamics
describing the entry and exit of sellers.(Buyers are, however, short lived which is
the same as assuming that they decide whether to purchase from the market each
period based on the currently available market statistic without regard to their past
experience) Given the population dynamics, the time preferences of sellers and the
valuations of buyers, the possible steady state distribution of sellers, the average
quality and the market thickness get endogenously determined. To focus our analysis
on the characterization of the steady states we do not explicitly model prices to begin
with but keep them exogenously ﬁxed. We later relax this assumption and study
how diﬀerent pricing mechanisms aﬀect the steady states and consider the eﬀects on
welfare.
1.2 Summary of results
We now provide a brief summary of our main results. An important thing to note is
the diﬀerence between a static version of our model and the steady state characteriza-
tion a static version of our model yields the low quality, low market thickness outcome
as the unique equilibrium while the dynamic model yields multiple steady states.
In characterizing the steady states, we derive conditions under which multiple
steady states emerge. It turns out that the patience of sellers and the proﬁts from
investing in high quality must reach a certain cutoﬀ value for multiple steady states
to emerge. However, if the relative proportion of high valuation buyers and patient
sellers is large compared to low valuation buyers and impatient sellers we get only
one steady state apart from the no trade equilibrium. Stability analysis shows that
equilibria involving mixed strategies are unstable and those involving pure strategies
are stable.
In comparing ﬁxed prices to optimizing pricing behavior we ﬁnd that most of our
qualitative results about the steady states are not aﬀected though for high enough
prices intermediate steady states get ruled out which means prices may play a role in
equilibrium selection. However, the distributional eﬀects are ambiguous-the higher
the proportion of low valuation buyers the lower are prices but there is a trade-oﬀ
between quality and consumers surplus-with low prices, expected consumer’s surplus
m a yb eh i g h e rb u ta v e r a g eq u a l i t yi sl o w e r .
A couple of important by-products come out from this model. Since the steady
state distribution of diﬀerent sellers gets endogenously determined it points out the
importance of time preferences and expectations about market conditions in deter-
mining the survival of new ﬁrms. A standard explanation in the literature is in terms
4of diﬀerent ﬁrms facing diﬀerent random shocks (which determines their exit).5This
model may perhaps provide a clue towards an alternate explanation. Another impor-
tant result we get is that market thickness (which is an index of demand ) matters
only upto a certain level and beyond that quality is driven by cost conditions and
preferences only. This is analogous to the market exhibiting Keynesian features (be-
ing demand driven) upto a certain point and then exhibiting classical characteristics
(where supply conditions drive the economy). This sharp result is partly an arte-
fact of the speciﬁc matching technology used but the general intuition is that market
thickness is more important when the market is relatively thin. This may partly
explain why even ﬂourishing markets are not invasion free from low quality products.
Finally, we discuss how this model may shed light on such diverse issues as the prob-
lems transition economies are facing to the diﬀerent quality of health care in various
urban centers of a developing nation like India.
2 Related literature
A brief survey of earlier related work will help us understand how the present work
diﬀers from earlier models of this type. The analysis of quality variation in mar-
kets characterized by asymmetric information (leading to market thinness), of course
dates back to Akerlof (1970). However, unlike the static lemons model, the distribu-
tion of quality and hence the average level of quality gets endogenously determined
in our model, which is more representative of certain markets where sellers can typ-
ically decide the level of quality they choose to produce. Moreover, the results in
Akerlof’s paper are substantively diﬀe r e n te v e ni fw ea l l o wf o rendogenous quality
choice-yielding only one equilibrium. The reason is that the future expected pay-
oﬀs are what may make costly investment attractive even though one period gains
are lower. Hence, a static version of our model yields the low quality low demand
equilibrium as the unique outcome.6 .
Thus, in some sense, our model is closely related to the models on endogenous qual-
ity choice in the Industrial Organization literature (see Shapiro (1983), for example).
These models typically use reputation to sustain equilibria involving investment in
quality which show one period losses. On the other hand, we analyze an environment
where reputation is hard to develop and there is only some kind of negative reputa-
tion (or punishment). Hence, in our environment new players are indistinguishable
from older ones and the average quality of the market is the only information that
potential buyers of the product have. We discuss several markets where this is so.7
5See Hopenhayn (1992) for instance.
6For variants of this which can yield multiplicity see Mas Colell, Whinston and Green (1998 )
pp. 438-444.
7The Internet has tried to develop a system of reputation but that is at best partially successful.
ebay has a system of buyer feedback. The value of positive feedback left by buyers is of doubtful
value, often left by friends or associates of the seller and are thus less reliable than negative feedback
5Moreover, demand is not endogenous in these models and thus one gets a unique out-
come in these ‘reputation’ models.8 Again, multiple equilibria models are not new in
the literature, nor are the multiplier eﬀects of policy intervention or other exogenous
perturbations. In that way, this shares some of the features of most multiple equilibria
models, in particular, exhibiting strategic complementarities as in the Cooper John
model (see Cooper and John, (1988) and Cooper (1999)). However, typically these
models are static in nature and have an inbuilt increasing returns property either in
the matching technology (see for instance Diamond (1982)) or in the payoﬀ functions
of players. In other words, these pure co ordination models represent one shot games
where future expectations do not determine current actions.9 Such calculations about
the future and comparison of current gains against future losses are however typical
of a ﬁrm’s optimizing behavior-what varies is the value attached by diﬀerent ﬁrms
to current as against future payoﬀs. In this paper, we explicitly model this dynamic
optimizing behavior. In its focus on multiplicity of equilibria as an explanation of
underdevelopment, this relates to earlier literature, most notably, Murphy, Shleifer
and Vishny (MSV, (1989)) but these papers also do not examine the intertemporal
maximization behavior of agents and are more akin to the search models of coordi-
nation failure. Since there is no linkage across time it is quite consistent in the MSV
model to have an economy coordinating on a high level of economic activity today to
coordinate on a low one tomorrow. Thus, these models are not suited to analyzing
transition dynamics, learning and the importance of expectations about future market
conditions in shaping current behavior. More importantly, these static models cannot
be used for simultaneously studying endogenous quality choice and demand which is
determined by the interaction between buyers and sellers. The present model, by
contrast, explicitly models this intertemporal process and rationalizes the existence
of multiple steady states when ﬁrms forego high current proﬁt in order to yield higher
future returns and has a structure which can be used to study the importance of out of
equilibrium dynamics and forward looking behavior in changing the long run state of
the market or economy. It also models how the distribution of population evolves over
time which few of these papers do. (An exception is Banerjee and Newman , (1993)
who model how the distribution of population changes. However, their concern is with
the interaction between occupational decisions and the distribution of wealth ,which
is very diﬀerent from the present work.). This interlinkage across time has been cap-
which closely corresponds with our model. (see the NYT article earlier cit. and Resnick and
Zeckhauser (2001) for details. The latter note that in the data set they look at, existing sellers do
not enjoy a boost in price over new entrants.)
8There are endogenous quality choice models in the money literature as well but their purpose is
to show how money acts as a uniform quality good and can help reduce the quality uncerainty when
goods are exchanged against money as oppsed to goods against goods.(See Williamson and Wright
(1994), for an example of such work.)
9For a somewhat diﬀerent type of model focusing on failure of co ordination leading to suboptimal
equilibria see Basu (1986). In his model diﬀerent conjectures lead to diﬀerent equilibria , showing
how crucially expectations matter .
6t u r e di nas o m e w h a td i ﬀerent context by Ghosh and Ray (1996) where buyers make
repeated entry into the market and hence market history matters but their paper
deals with the levels of cooperation which can be sustained when bad past conduct of
sellers cannot be punished.10 Another related work is that of Kranton (1996) which
shows how increases in market thickness can cause alternate forms of exchange (like
reciprocal exchange) to diminish, while the widespread use of personalized exchange
can itself cause markets to remain thin, hence causing such exchanges to persist over
time. The questions addressed viz. the interaction between two diﬀerent institutions
for exchange and the model she uses are completely diﬀerent from this present work.
Finally, mention may be made of the important literature which looks at sustaining
co operation when there are no oﬃcial law enforcement agencies (see in particular
Tirole (1996) who looks at a scenario where only one party has an incentive to cheat
and Dixit (2003) where both parties may cheat). The role of intermediaries while not
discussed formally in this paper is an important complementary area of research.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets up the basic model. In sec-
tion 4 we do a steady state analysis. Section 5 considers the implications of regulated
pricing vs. (some version of) optimized prices. Section 6 discusses illustrations and
extensions. Most of the proofs are in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 considers a modiﬁca-
tion of the basic model to show how technologies involving scale economies over time,
perhaps due to ‘learning by doing ’, helps us in overcoming the uncertainty about
quality under certain parameter values.
3T h e m o d e l
This is an inﬁnite horizon model with discrete time. There are two sides of the market,
buyers and sellers. Each period the market opens and two types of objects are on
sale-a high quality type and a low quality type. Buyers have diﬀering valuations for
the high quality good. For simplicity, we consider only two types of buyers, those
with a low valuation which we denote by VL and those with a high valuation denoted
by VH.(We assume that low valuation goods are uniformly valued by all buyers and
we normalize it to 0.)11 Sellers are also of two types, those with a low discount factor
δl and those with a high discount factor δh.(This discount factor can be interpreted
10For an interesting study of how history can matter and related dynamics see Adsera and Ray
(2000). There are also other dynamic models eg. models of repeated purchases (see Hendel and
Lizzeri , (1999)) but their concern is very diﬀerent from the present work.
11The assumption of no gains from trade in the low quality good simpliﬁes the exposition but makes
no diﬀerence as shown in Appendix 2. Thus this assumption is not restrictive. However,we work
out a case in the Appendix to show that it can make a diﬀerence when the costs are time dependent
perhaps because there is ‘learning by doing’. In that case separating equilbria can emerge.
7as a survival probability.)12Thus, there are four types of agents in the economy.13
Cost, technology and endowments are as follows. High quality goods are produced
at a higher cost than low quality goods-we normalize the cost of low quality goods to
0 and the high quality is produced at constant cost per unit denoted by c.H o w e v e r ,
given the asymmetry of information, all goods in the market are sold at a uniform
price which we assume to be ﬁxed exogenously at p.14 Note also that sellers have
excess capacity and can produce goods to demand. Given constant unit costs, gains
per unit from the high quality good is also a constant every period which we denote
by π = p − c.
T h e r ei sa s y m m e t r i ci n f o r m a t i o no ft h ef o l l o w i n gt y p e-b u y e r sc a n n o td i s t i n g u i s h
between the low and high quality good before purchase. 15Moreover, they do not
k n o wt h et y p eo ft h es e l l e r s( i . e .t h ed i s c o u n tf a c t o ro fa ni n d i v i d u a ls e l l e r )b u to n l y
the ratio of the two types of sellers in the population. Sellers also cannot distinguish
t h et w ot y p e so fb u y e r sa n dk n o wo n l yt h er a t i oo ft h et w ot y p e s .T h ep a s th i s t o r y
of market transactions is summarized by two parameters giving the ratio of buyers
to sellers (market thickness) and the ratio of high quality goods to low quality goods
sold every period. The history of individual transactions that have taken place in the
past is not known but these summary statistics are known to all agents. Given these,
buyers and sellers have to form expectations about the market thickness and quality
at the beginning of each period.
Matching is random in that at any instant in time each seller may meet q buyers
(i.e. q is the expected number of buyers per seller every period i.e. it is the market
thickness in that period) 16
Buyers are expected utility maximizers and base their entry decision on the ex-
pected gains from trade. Thus, a buyer’s decision is based on his valuation and his
expectation of acquiring the high quality object. He enters if his expected utility from
buying the good is greater than the price he pays for it. Sellers are also expected
12By allowing randomizations we get continuity in our endogenous variables (quality and market
thickness) which is why we do not believe this framework to be unduly restrictive.
13It is important to mention that though we are dealing with ﬁnite numbers, we assume that no
agent in the economy believes that his action has any inﬂuence on market outcome.
14We endogenize prices in the next section.
15The earlier example of phone cards comes readily to mind as an example of an experience good
where one discovers the true value of the card only after one has used it-a high quality one gives the
advertised number of minutes and quality sound, a low one would give less minutes than advertised
and poor quality of sound .
16The matching technology can be thought of as follows. For the case of less buyers than
sellers, assign each buyer to a seller until there are no more buyers. Considering all possible
permutations of sellers gives us nt/S as the matching probability. When there are more buy-
ers than sellers, ﬁrst assign the same number of buyers per seller. The remaining buyers are
matched as in the case with less buyers than sellers giving us the required result. For a con-
tinuum of sellers it is helpful to think of this as some approximation of large discrete numbers.
See Binmore and Herrero (1988) who get this result for a continuum. Thus we circumvent the
problem that for two continuous interval there is a one to one correspondence between them.
8utility maximizers and maximize the present discounted value of lifetime earnings.
Each period they can sell a low quality good and face a lower continuation payoﬀ (in
the form of being identiﬁed by the buyer who presumably spreads this information)
from then on or sell a high quality good and face a higher continuation payoﬀ.W e
assume that the future payoﬀs after selling the low quality good is 0.T h i s c a n b e
thought of as being driven out of the market forever.17 The seller’s decision thus
d e p e n d so nh i sf o r e c a s ta b o u tf u t u r em a r k e tc o n d i t i o n s( i . e .t h ef u t u r ep o s s i b i l i t i e s
of being matched with a buyer which is the same as his forecast about future market
thickness) and his discount factor. Speciﬁcally, we assume that the seller forms point
estimates about future market thickness for all future time periods upto inﬁnity. We
do not ,however, specify an explicit mechanism by which his expectations are formed.
Thus the sellers’ trade-oﬀ is a high one period gain and nothing thereafter to a low
one period gain and a probability of future sales in the same market. From now
on, selling a low quality object will be referred to as cheating. Buyers’ decisions to
purchase from a seller will be referred to as entering the market.
To concentrate on the sellers’ problem we assume the buyers live only one period.
Each period there is a potential pool of buyers some of whom choose to enter the
market and others choose not to enter. If they enter they may purchase only one unit
of the good. Every period there is again a fresh pool who base their decision on the
currently available market information (i.e. the summary statistics available of past
transactions) about the probability of being cheated.18
The population dynamics of the sellers are however more complicated. Every
period sellers who are matched and cheat are thrown out (i.e. dishonest sellers who
are matched die with probability 1) and a fraction of the unmatched sellers (if q is
less than 1) die .The rate at which they die can be calculated from their survival
probabilities. At the same time new sellers of either type enter in an exogenously
ﬁxed proportion. Thus, given the ﬁxed ratio at which sellers are replaced, the existing
distribution of the two types every period together with the market thickness and the
decisions of the two types determine the ratio of the two types (the state variable)
in the population next period. In other words, the distribution of population evolves
endogenously.
Thus, while for a buyer a strategy is simply an action i.e. a decision whether
to enter the market or not enter based on his expectations about the probability of
getting a high quality object, for a seller a strategy is more complicated and has to
specify his action every period as well as for all periods to come and will essentially
be a sequence of actions cheat and not cheat depending on past history and future
expectations.
An equilibrium is a strategy proﬁle where every player is playing his best response
17This is merely a convenient assumption. All we need is that those who produce high quality
goods face better future payoﬀs than those who produce low quality goods.
18All this means is that buyers are not basing their decision on entering the market each period
based on thir past experience but on the current information about market conditions.
9to the strategy of others. A steady state is a more restricted class of equilibria where
every period the parameters of the model are unchanged-that is every period the same
number of buyers enter and the same number of sellers cheat. Births equal deaths
and the ratio in which the two types are born is exogenous and given by a and 1−a.
In steady state, given this inﬂow, the distribution of the two types of sellers in the
population are unchanged.
More formally, let N denote the stock of potential buyers and nt those who enter
t h em a r k e ti np e r i o dt.L e tS denote the stock of sellers which is a constant.19 Thus
qt = nt/S (In steady state the time subscripts can be dropped.)
Buyers’ objective function
Buyer of type i solves the following problem max(xVi − p,0) (i = H,L) where
x is the probability of meeting an honest seller. Thus, for a buyer, his strategy is
simply whether to enter or not enter. We denote his set of strategies (which are the
same as his set of available actions ) by A.
Sellers’ objective function
In time period t seller j maximizes Vj(qt,q t+1,q t+2,...)=m a x ( VC,V NC) where the
subscripts C and NC are used to distinguish the discounted payoﬀsf r o md e c i d i n gt o
be dishonest in period t (cheat) and honest in period t respectively. The V function
looks a little diﬀerent depending on whether q is less than or greater than 1.(Note
that at q<1 it is interpreted as a probability of a match)
For q less than 1, VC = pqt +( 1− qt)δE(V (q0))where V (q0) is the continuation
payoﬀ if an optimal policy is followed from period t +1(q0 is used as a shorthand
for the sequence of future market thickness).E is used to denote the fact that this is
the expected continuation payoﬀ of the sellers based on his (point) estimates about
future market thickness. This equation is explained very simply-with probability q a
cheat meets a buyer, gets p units of money and 0 thereafter. With a probability 1−q
he does not meet a buyer and simply goes through the same optimization process
again based on the expected value of the current market statistic. This is discounted
by seller of type j (j = h,l) at the rate δj.
Similarly, VNC = qt(π + δV(q0)) + (1 − qt)δE(V (q0)).
Thus a seller simply chooses the maximum of these. In the steady state we shall
see that he will choose a stationary strategy (or randomize) when called upon to
move. The set of possible strategies (which we denote by Ω)i so fc o u r s em u c hl a r g e r .
Thus, possible (but not optimal) strategies for a seller are being dishonest in period
1,2,..and so on.20
19This can be thought of as a limit imposed by the available space in the marketplace-there are
only S slots and we further assume that they are ﬁlled every period-hence total births equal total
deaths in each period but the distribution of sellers outside the steady state can change. In steady
state, the distribution every period is the same but is not equal to the constant proportion of births
of the two types every period.
20Note, that while randomizing, if a player randomizes with probability z over an action A,w e
mean that z fraction of players play A with probability 1. As we are dealing with large numbers
this does not make much diﬀerence, though it is, strictly speaking, correct only for a continuum
10For q greater than 1 Vc = pqt and VNC = πqt + δE(V (q0))
Thus given (n,S,A,Ω,EU,V,δ,NL,Sl,x)∞
t ,q)∞
t ) we have all the components of
a Bayesian game (NL and Sl are the number of VL buyers and the number of
δlsellers) and the natural solution concept to employ is a Perfect Bayesian Nash
(with out of equilibrium beliefs appropriately deﬁned). However, in the next section
we concentrate on a more restricted class of solutions viz. the steady state where the
market parameters are unchanging.
4 Steady State Analysis
H e r e ,w ea n a l y z et h em a r k e tw h e nt h ep a r a m e t e r so ft h em o d e la r eu n c h a n g i n go v e r
t i m e .T h e r ei sac o n s t a n tr a t i oo ft h et w ot ypes of buyers and a constant ratio of the
two types of sellers. Given that, the market thickness (q = n/S)a sw e l la st h el e v e lo f
honesty (x) is constant.(We keep p exogenously ﬁxed in this section for convenience).
Formally a steady state is deﬁned as follows
Deﬁnition 1 A steady state is a pair (n,x) ,for a given price, p, such that
1. Buyers maximize expected utility.
2. Sellers maximize lifetime discounted payoﬀs.
3. 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ n ≤ N.
We now characterize the steady state for the two type case.
Let x be the probability of meeting an honest seller21 and let γ and 1 − γ be the
(steady state) fractions of the two types of sellers δh and δl in the market. We use si to
denote the probability that type i seller is honest. (i = l,h.)T h u s ,x = γsh+(1−γ)sl.
For a buyer, denote by bi the probability of entry in the market and by ni the number
of type i buyers.(i = L,H). Given our assumption on buyers’ valuations (VL <V H)
and sellers’ discount factors, (δl <δ h) the admissible randomizations for buyers and
sellers can be divided into the following cases:
Buyer bL= bH =0 bL= 0 < bH < 1
bL= 0 < bH =1 0 < bL< bH= 1b L= bH= 1
Seller sL= sH =0 sL= 0 < sH < 1
sL= 0 < sH =1 0 < sL< sH= 1s L= sH= 1
Steady state equations giving us the fraction of each type of seller is obtained by
equating total births and deaths. Births are in an exogenously ﬁxed ratio. In a steady
state, the fraction of each type of seller in the market will be unchanged. When there
of agents, which we do not have in this paper. However, it ensures that the market thickness and
quality are not random variables and thus we are able to talk of steady state values of the variables
rather than steady state distributions of these variables.
21We take that to be equal to the proportion of high quality goods sold which is a fair approxi-
mation for a large population. Since we are doing ex ante maximization this seems reasonable.
11are fewer buyers than sellers the following two equations provide exact expressions
for these quantities:22
Sγ ((1 − q)(1−δh )+q(1 − sh +sh (1−δh)) ) =aB (1)
S(1−γ )((1 − q)(1−δl )+q(1 − sl +sl (1−δl)) ) =( 1− a)B (2)
D ≡ B (3)
Here, a denotes the exogenously ﬁxed ratio of type δh sellers entering the popula-
tion, D the number of deaths each period and B denotes the total number of births
in that period. Note that D = B always holds where D is obtained from adding the
ﬁrst two equations. This is because we have assumed that the total number of births
is always equal to total number of deaths (ﬁxed number of sellers in the market). In
addition, in steady state the above two equations hold i.e. in steady state the number
of deaths of each type of seller is equal to the number of births of each type. The
equation can be explained quite simply-the unmatched fraction of sellers (1−q)d i ea t
ar a t e1−δ. The fraction of matched sellers is q. They are honest with a probability
1−s in which case they die at their natural rate of 1−δ. The dishonest fraction (qs)
die with probability 1.23
From this we can ﬁnd out the steady state ratio of sellers for the diﬀerent types of
randomizations. Together with the buyers’ and sellers’ incentive constraints we can
get the possible equilibria in our model. The following Lemma gives us the simpliﬁed
steady state expressions for the buyers’ and sellers’ optimization problem.
Lemma 1 In steady state and for q<1 the sellers’ decision problem simpliﬁes to
the following rule:





1 − (1 − q)δj
is indiﬀerent if this holds with equality).
Proof. In steady state γt = γ, qt = q and xt = x. Given this, a seller of type j
chooses to maximize V = Max (VC,V NC). Putting qt = q for all t we get
VC =
pq
1 − (1 − q)δj
22Note that the distribution of sellers in the population will not, in general, be equal to the
distribution of new born sellers. This is because impatient sellers survive for shorter periods which
is why the exogenous ratio of births must have higher proportion of impatient types than in the
population.
23Of course, there is an integer problem here in that the number of sellers may be fractions. Since





. Thus, the seller chooses the maximum of the two.
When q is greater than 1 the steady state equations get simpliﬁed. Now there is no
uncertainty about meeting a buyer-q is simply the expected number of buyers every
period. Thus, dishonest sellers die with probability 1 and the steady state equations
reduce to
Sγ(1 − sh + sh(1 − δh)) = aD (4)
S(1 − γ)(1 − sl + sl(1 − δl)) = (1 − a)D (5)
We can work out the diﬀerent types of steady states using the admissible values of
buyers’ and sellers’ randomizations. Together with the incentive constraints we can
ﬁnd out what steady states can be supported for diﬀerent parameter values. We look
at this in detail in the appendix. Even without the detailed algebra, however, we can
understand what is going on quite clearly by drawing graphs of how the thickness
of markets change (because of the buyers’ entry decision) with the steady state level
of honesty and how the level of honesty changes with the market thickness. The
intersection of the two curves gives us the possible steady states.
For certain parametrizations which yield multiplicity, we plot two graphs illus-
trating this. In ﬁgure 1 we plot the level of honesty (x) as a function of market
thickness (q). Note that more thickness can never induce less honesty so the curve
will never slope down.24 In ﬁgure 1 upto qh both types prefer to be dishonest so x
is zero. At qh the sellers with discount factor δh are indiﬀerent to being honest and
dishonest. So they randomize-as sh, which is the randomization probability of type
δhbeing honest rises, so does the steady state level of honesty. Beyond qh type δh
strictly prefers to be honest and type δl still prefers to be honest. However if q is
less than 1 it increases the probability of matching and impatient sellers get knocked
out faster which means that the steady state level of the impatient type gets lowered
thereby raising the level of honesty. (The mathematics showing the convex shape is
worked out in the appendix). At ql the δl type is indiﬀerent and beyond that both
types prefer to be honest. Note that this is not the only possible shape of the curve.
There are some conditions on the minimum amount of patience and gains from trade
for sellers to decide to be honest at some level of market thickness. Moreover, when
the market thickness is such that q is unity or more we will see how these conditions
entirely determine sellers behavior (beyond q =1market thickness has no eﬀect on
the level of honesty). Thus this curve can be thought of as the sellers response curve.
In ﬁgure 2 w ep l o tt h er e s p o n s eo fb u y e r s(a n dh e n c em a r k e tt h i c k n e s s )t ot h e
level of honesty. The interpretation is similar but there is no convex portion because
24The suﬃcient condition for multiplicity ensures this.
13buyers live only 1 period and thus their steady state is not endogenously determined.
We call this the buyers’ response curve.
In ﬁgure 3 we plot the two curves together and their intersection gives us the
steady states. In general, we get multiple steady states. We now present some
propositions about the existence of multiple steady states and bounds on market
thickness(q) which induce this.All the proofs are in the Appendix.









for all j or N ≥ S then multiple equilibria exists. (Suﬃcient condition)
These are conditions on the minimum level of patience and gains from trade
necessary to ensure that at least one type of seller ﬁnds it optimal to be honest at
some level of market thickness. Moreover the sellers and buyers decision must be
mutually consistent in the sense that the level of honesty of type j seller must induce
that market thickness at which they choose to be honest).
Proposition 2 Non degenerate multiple equilibria exist if the necessary and suﬃcient





















25x∗ can be calculated using the steady state equations. In case 2 worked out in Appendix 1
putting sh =1w ec a nﬁnd γ and hence x∗.
14This proposition sets conditions on the proportion of the two types on either side
of the market. Intuitively, this means that if there are too many patient sellers or
high valuation buyers the only steady state involving positive trade will have the high
quality goods on sale with all buyers entering. The intuition is clear from ﬁgure 3.
As the steady states can be Pareto ranked we can speak of non degenerate states as
ﬁrst, second etc. in ascending order of quality and demand. Given the conditions
in this proposition, we can characterize the ﬁrst non degenerate steady state quite
sharply i.e. we can calculate the randomizations by buyers and sellers that support
this. Corollary 1 formalizes this.
Corollary 1 If Proposition 2 holds then the ﬁrst non zero steady state involves ran-
domization by type H buyers and type h sellers with the level of honesty at xh and the
market thickness at qh. Thus, the corresponding randomizations can be calculated.
Figure 3 makes this quite clear.
Proposition 3 If q>1 then the equilibria are entirely dependent on the gains from
trade (p − c) and the discount factors (δ ).
The intuition is that beyond a certain level of market thickness (q =1 ) gains from
being honest and cheating go up by the same factor so whatever was optimal for a
seller at some market thickness ( greater than unity) still remains optimal.
4.1 A discussion of stability
We give an intuitive analysis of the stability of our equilibria. The diﬃculty of
formalizing the argument arises from the fact that there are three variables which
change over time viz. q,x and γ. Thus it becomes impossible to analyze stability
in terms of the ﬁgures since the sellers response curves are drawn for steady state
values of γ. We can of course deﬁne a law of motion which will map qt,x t,γt into
qt+1,x t+1,γt+1. However, this will be quite complicated as the law of motion will look
diﬀerent in diﬀerent segments of the q,x,γ p l a n e.W el e a v es u c haf o r m a la n a l y s i s
for future research. Here, we provide an informal argument to show how the system
behaves when players follow a static expectation rule to decide on their strategies
every period. We will analyze the system for local perturbations around the steady
state in diﬀerent regions.
Consider the following rule to analyze stability in this model. If any point (q,x,γ)
is not a steady state of the model buyers assume that this will be the current value of
x,γ and optimize accordingly. In similar vein, sellers assume this to be the values of
q,γ which will prevail forever and reoptimize accordingly. Following this rule it turns
out that the odd equilibria are stable and the even equilibria are unstable. This is
15because the odd equilibria involve pure strategies26 and the even equilibria involve
mixed strategies. Therefore, for local perturbations around a steady state involving
mixed strategies a large fraction of agents change their actions (they were indiﬀerent
between two pure strategies in equilibrium) causing a big movement away from the
steady state while for pure strategies local perturbations (with static expectations)
do not change the strategies of agents as the inequalities which decide their optimal
action are unaﬀected.
To see this more clearly it is useful to divide the (q,x) plane into diﬀerent parts
as the state variable (the distribution of δl and δh)t a k e sd i ﬀerent values in diﬀerent
regions. Thus for any given q,x and a corresponding distribution(γ)o ft h et w ot y p e s
of sellers our adjustment process will give us a new q,x and γ.
For illustrative purposes, we consider small changes in q and x holding γ at the
steady state level and then track the system as agents reoptimize using the static
expectation rule. Let us denote by q∗(x) and x∗(q) the optimal level of market
thickness and honesty as functions of honesty and market thickness respectively.
When we have a non steady state value of x buyers adjust their behavior in the
sense that next period’s buyers take that to be the expected value of x and behave
accordingly. Thus, when x<x h no buyer enters, so starting from a non steady
state pair (qt,x t), qt+1 =0 . Similarly for x>x l we would have qt+1 jumping to
N/S. For the seller things are a bit more complicated because of their population
dynamics. The static adjustment rule is that both types take the expected value
o ft h em a r k e ts t a t i s t i cq in period t +1t ob et h es a m ea st h eo b s e r v e dq in t and
optimize accordingly. Thus, for q<q h both types cheat in period t +1 .I fq indeed
remained unchanged the population death rate next period would be given by the
following expression
(1 − δh + q)γt
(1 − δl + q)(1 − γt)
.
Therefore, in the region where q<q h and x<x h we would have the ratio of the two







(1 − δh)(1 − a)
.
(This is quite intuitive since the initial value of x was positive which would have
implied a higher value of γ for any positive q. This is because at least a proportion
of the high type of seller was being honest and hence their death rate was lower than
that given by the right hand side of the above expression. Now with x =0both
types are getting knocked out at the rate given by the above expression lowering γ
until equality is established).27 Note of course that this only implies local stability of
the (0,0) steady state-to see this take q =0and x =1and see that we get cyclical
26T h e s ep u r es t r a t e g i e sm u s tb es t r i c t .
27If x =0to begin with the equation is already satisﬁed.
16behavior. To see that the second equilibrium is unstable notice that for a value of x
greater than the steady state value q jumps to
nh
S (since at the steady state value they
were indiﬀerent any slightly bigger value would cause all of them to strictly prefer
to enter the market). Similarly, with q greater than the equilibrium value all patient
sellers switch to honesty, the value of γ goes up and the level of honesty rises. As
the δl sellers die faster x reaches the limiting value given by the intersection with the
buyers response curve and the economy reaches the next steady state. The analysis
being similar we do not describe this for all the regions.
5P r i c e M e c h a n i s m s
So far prices were exogenous in the model. It was a useful ﬁrst simpliﬁcation and it
can be justiﬁed by thinking of the good in question having a regulated price (we can
think of the government, for instance, ﬁxing the price but being unable to control
the quality-a typical feature of various developing and transition economies.). We
now look at how the model behaves when we explicitly introduce a mechanism for
p r i c ef o r m a t i o n .W eb r i e ﬂy consider the implications for this model when prices are
posted in the market by sellers and see how it diﬀers depending on whether this is
posted before or after matching. We consider alternate speciﬁcations to see what sort
of equilibrium prices can be supported.
More precisely, suppose the timing of the process is as follows:
Sellers post prices, buyers look at prices and choose the seller with the lower price-
randomly if prices are the same. In this case it is not diﬃcult to see that the sellers
compete away all their surplus. However, this cannot be an equilibrium since at the
level where sellers are robbed of all surplus they would prefer to produce the low
quality good. Buyers correctly assess this leading to only low quality goods sold at a
price of zero (or no trade) as the only sustainable steady state.28 This provides one
more example of how competitive pricing can be harmful and can justify government
intervention in regulating prices even when it cannot regulate quality. The recent
debate about the eﬀect of competitive pricing on the quality of LASIK surgery (see,
for instance, The Washington Post, February 22, 2000 for a chatty piece summarizing
these fears) seems to be based on this type of argument.
Now think of the same type of story but with diﬀerent beliefs about the buyers
interpreting a lower price as a signal of low quality. In that case, a whole range
of prices can be sustained, from the price which satisﬁes at least one of the sellers
incentive constraints to the monopoly price wh i c hr o b st h eh i g ht y p eo fa l lt h es u r p l u s .
Whether this entire range can be satisﬁed of course depend on the parameter values
(cost, preferences and valuations) and the analysis would be much the same as with
ﬁxed prices. The welfare eﬀects would vary as the diﬀerent prices leave buyers and
sellers with diﬀerent surplus.
28This is similar to what happens in a symmetric Bertrand game.
17Finally, consider a mechanism a la Diamond (1971).
Buyers are matched with sellers randomly. Sellers announce prices. A buyer
has information only about the price announcement of the seller with whom he is
matched. A buyer then decides whether to buy or not. If a buyer does not buy, he
can be rematched at a small cost  . We assume that in every match each type of
buyer will have a cutoﬀ value, if the announced price is above that he will want to
be rematched (or leave the market)-otherwise he will buy.
We ﬁrst provide an informal analysis of what the equilibrium of this game will look
like. Intuitively, a few things seem evident-both type of sellers will announce the same
price since any lower price will eﬀectively signal his low quality good. This would
contradict the fact that we cannot have a separating equilibrium in this environment
(see Appendix 2). Moreover, given the rematching cost,any equilibrium which is
eﬃcient implies agreement in the ﬁrst period.29 If sellers announce prices such that
only the high type of buyer enters, the buyer will be rid of all his surplus. Moreover,
in any stationary equilibrium, the price will be such that the low type of buyer will
always be kept to his reservation level since at any lower price the seller can always
charge a higher price, cause the low type to enter and be better oﬀ.T h i s i s a l s o
i n t u i t i v e-i fh ed o e sn o te n t e ra tt h a tp r i c eh eg e t sz e r os u r p l u s-i fh ee n t e r st h e
price at which he buys will be such that his expected net utility is zero. Next,we will
see that a price of either pl or ph will prevail which are the prices which keeps the
low and high type buyer with no expected surplus respectively. We can show this
by taking any arbitrary lower price and show that the seller who is matched always
does better by raising price by  . We formalize this in three propositions one of which
basically spells out the incentive constraints which need to be satisﬁed.
Proposition 4 (Price Proposition1) For steady states with positive levels of trade
to exist the steady state equilibrium price (p*) must be the same for all sellers.
Proof. For the same types of sellers and buyers (i.e. discount factor and valua-
tion) suppose p∗ was diﬀerent i.e. the equilibrium price conﬁguration had diﬀerent
sellers charging diﬀerent prices. Any price which diﬀers by   cannot be an equilibrium
since either the seller charging the lower price should increase the price and increase
his proﬁt or the seller charging the higher price should decrease his price to increase
his expected proﬁt. This is because at price p if the buyer is buying from a seller so
will he at price p −  . However, at price p, if no one is willing to buy, clearly sellers
must lower price for trade to occur. Now consider any set of arbitrary prices diﬀering
by more than  . Consider any but the highest price at which the buyer is willing to
trade in this conﬁguration of prices. Call this arbitrarily selected price charged by a
seller pa.He should also be willing to trade at pa +   because of the rematching cost.
Thus, for the same types of sellers and buyers (i.e. discount factor and valuation)
29It might be possible to construct Nash equilibria involving delays but there does not seem
reasonable beliefs to support that. In particular, they would not be sequentially rational.
18the argument in Diamond (1971) holds. Suppose, diﬀerent types of sellers charge
diﬀerent prices. This implies existence of a separating equilibrium which has been
shown not to exist. Finally, diﬀe r e n tb u y e r sc a n n o tb ec h a r g e dd i ﬀerent prices as
sellers cannot distinguish types, hence price announcements cannot be conditioned
on buyer types.
Proposition 5 (Price Proposition 2) A property of this equilibrium price p∗ is
that p∗δ ≥ c for at least one j (j=l,h) and max (xVi − p∗,0) ≥ 0 for at least one
i(i = L,H) where x is a steady state level of honesty consistent with p∗.F u r t h e r ,i f





Proof. From the necessary condition for multiplicity we know that p∗δ ≥ ci for
at least one i, sets bounds below which the equilibrium price cannot fall in a non
zero steady state. If this did not hold the seller’s incentive constraint to produce high
quality is violated for both types -knowing this buyers will not pay any positive price
for the good. The second part of the proposition is the incentive constraint of the
buyer to enter which must be satisﬁed. Finally, the market thickness must satisfy the
incentive constraint of the seller.
Proposition 6 (Price Proposition 3) Let pl and ph be the maximum prices at
which the low type and high type buyer would enter the market (for a given market







or vice versa for all sellers.
Proof. Consider some other price p0 diﬀerent from p∗.N o w i f p0 ≤ p∗ a seller
jshould be able to raise it by  /k (k ≥ 1) and it would still be optimal for the buyer
to buy (since buying at the next round of matching at p0 is equivalent to buying in the
present round at p0 +  ). Again p0 ≥ p∗ lowers proﬁts in expected terms. The price
is pl if the gains from selling at pl to all buyers exceed that from selling at a higher
price ph to only the high type of buyer depending on the population distribution of
the two types. Since N
S pl and n2
S ph gives the expected revenue from the two types.
The greater of the two determines the equilibrium price.
As with the case of exogenous pricing, a number of cases arise and many of them
are similar. We thus do not do a detailed analysis for all the cases but note that the
following possibilities can arise viz. : pl is the price and all buyers enter because at
that expected level of honesty (x) all buyers get positive expected utility (i.e.xVi ≥
p∗∀i or ph is the price and only the high valuation types enter.)Randomizations are
19of course possible, at pl the impatient seller may randomize which may be sustained
by a fraction of the low valuation buyers entering)
Some welfare considerations are however worth analyzing in comparing ﬁxed price
vs. posted prices. If the low valuation buyer was participating in the market by
entering at the ﬁxed price it is likely that he had positive surplus-in the posted price
environment he is always held to his reservation level of utility. Thus the low type
buyer can never be better oﬀ when sellers (optimally) choose prices. The high valued
buyer may or may not be better oﬀ-if pl is the prevailing price it would depend on
whether this gives him more surplus than the ﬁxed price situation (i.e. whether
xVH − p ≥ x0VH − p∗ where x and x0 denote the steady state levels of honesty with
ﬁxed and posted prices respectively. Note that there can be no unambiguous answer
as there are multiple steady states in both situations). Moreover, the low type creates
an externality for the higher type as the higher the proportion of low types in the
population of buyers the more likely that pl will be charged. What about sellers? It
might appear that he would be better oﬀ since he is now optimally choosing prices
but the analysis is not so simple because we need to specify the steady states across
which we are comparing. Thus this is true only when we compare steady states with
the same level of market activity. We can also say something about quality. If the
optimal p (i.e. the p satisfying the three price proposition) satisﬁes the conditions for
both types of sellers to produce the high quality good, consistent with the buyer’s
maximization exercise, such a price can eﬀectively serve as a signaling mechanism
indicating high quality. Thus, in such a case it might be worthwhile for a central
authority with a preference for consumer welfare as well as quality to try ﬁxing the
price at a level at which both types of sellers are honest so that the buyer is also left
with some surplus.
That,of course, is not the only way to endogenize prices. Another asymmetry
comes to mind-if dishonest sellers can be identiﬁed it might seem natural that we
should also be able to identify honest sellers which means that existing sellers should
enjoy a market advantage over new entrants. This is missing in the simple matching
technology we have outlined. However, if old sellers charge higher prices ,we can ﬁnd
a distribution of prices according to how well established a seller is. An equilibrium
conﬁguration would have diﬀerent subgroups of buyers being catered to by diﬀerent
sellers-thus we would have price variation and market segmentation as we so often
do in the real world. That, however, is a topic for a separate line of research which
we do not pursue here. In our information structure only dishonesty is identiﬁed-the
r e m a i n i n gm a r k e tp l a y e r sa r ee i t h e rh o n e s to rn e we n t r a n t sw h oc a n n o tb ed i s t i n -
guished. One can think of this as a society where complaints are recorded -a lack of
complaints indicates either good behavior or past inactivity and are indistinguishable
for the agents at the beginning of market activity each period. This seems a reason-
ably good approximation for transition and emerging economies where past history
of sellers are hard to come by .There is punishment for bad conduct (perhaps in the
form of public announcements. See Greif, Milgrom and Weingast,(1994) for one ex-
20ample of such an authority where complaints could be recorded) but the emerging
marketplace has no eﬀective mechanism to record past individual activities. We can
also justify this for cases where information is available for pooled samples only ,as
in the market for milk, where milk from diﬀerent farmers is mixed and can only be
traced back when there are complaints.30
6 Extensions and Applications
Here we give some illustrations of markets where our model may provide some insight
and discuss some extensions to the basic model.
6.1 Illustrations:
1.Transition economies
Russia and several erstwhile communist countries underwent a transition and from
centralized planning moved towards a market economy. Hence the potential to switch
to high quality was created with a move to a market based structure. However, as
noted in McMillan (earlier cit.) ‘New ﬁrms ﬁnd it diﬃcult to sell their products...(due
to the) problem of ﬁnding potential customers’.Thus, there was inadequate market
information and in most of Vietnam private enterprise ‘Most ﬁrms ..sold only to local
customers’ causing the market to remain thin. To get out of it Mcmillan discusses
the role of ‘chambers of commerce, credit bureaus, and trade organizations which
seems consistent with the policy recommendations our model has to oﬀer. The fact
that this did in fact occur in various economies as a result of conscious policy bears
out our argument that there was nothing missing in technology or preferences which
was keeping these economies at low levels of trade with dubious quality on sale.
2. Diﬀering quality of medical facilities in various big cities in India.
Individual buyers of medical services usually try to assess the quality of the ser-
vice being oﬀered at various centers but are unlikely to have detailed knowledge of
30A sn o t e de a r l i e r ,i ne b a yb o t hg o o da n db a dc o m m e n t sc a nb er e c o r d e db u tg o o dc o m m e n t s
have less credence as sellers often leave good comments to boost each other’s market. Complaints
o rb a dc o m m e n t sh a v et ob ev e r i ﬁed
In traded items across countries some products are not identiﬁed by individual seller/supplier.
However when found defective the individual seller is tracked down and has to pay a penalty. The
same is true for milk from farmers in most states in the US where the milk is pooled before being
sold. Tracking farmers would be attempted only if there is a complaint. Moreover, the idea that
pooled history is available and determines optimal decision has been explored in a diﬀerent context
by Tirole (1996) which conforms in a milder way to our idea that past indivdual histories are
imperfectly observed.
Note, also, that there may be strategic reasons for buyers not to reveal information to others
about ‘good’ sellers /products (as in the case of certain software but we do not analyze this here.)
21individual providers and depend on the reputation of the center or ‘group’ with which
the provider is associated. It is part of ‘folk knowledge’ that various cities in India
oﬀer medical facilities which show wide variation in quality, especially as perceived
by consumers (patients). Some of the ‘Centers of excellence’ enjoy a market share
which does not seem to stem from any fundamental diﬀerence in primitives i.e. the
technology of medical centers and the qualiﬁcations of doctors. As perceived quality
is hard to measure, there has been no rigorous study of this. However in detailed
case studies undertaken by UNDP (see Bandyopadhyay and Gupta 1997 a and b)
certain illuminating facts about the organs transplant scenario came out which are
worth noting.
There is a wide variation in the number of transplants carried out in East India and
South India -comparing big cities in the South, the average number of transplants
in 2 major centers in Chennai ( a big city in the South) total over 300 and there
are quite a few other centers in Chennai where the yearly average is around 100.
In contrast, in Calcutta, the major city in the East where such surgery is carried
out, the total number in the two major centers in ten years adds to less than four
hundred (other centers contribute a negligible amount -transplants are occasional
features there.) Thus the ‘market thickness’ is vastly diﬀerent with Calcutta having,
on an average, customers (transplant recipients) of about thirty ﬁve in the two major
centers as against over three hundred in Chennai. However, the qualiﬁcations of
doctors are equivalent in both cities and the Hospitals have comparable facilities
(both centers in Calcutta satisfy the rigorous speciﬁcations required to obtain licence
under The Transplantation of Human Organs Rules, 1995).It also appears from the
study (earlier cit.) that the quality, as measured by patient satisfaction, is low.
From detailed questioning of patients about quality of care, behavior of doctors and
nursing staﬀ etc. the authors note widespread satisfaction in patients who have
undergone transplants in Madras as opposed to Calcutta. Indeed they conclude ‘The
phenomenon of transplant migration has been continuing over the years as more and
more patients in need of a kidney move to other parts of India , notably Chennai,
Vellore and Bangalore ...hospitals (in Calcutta) have suﬀered because of charges of
negligence ..in health care.’ Thus, the hypothesis of quality being directly related to
market thickness seems borne out.
T a b l e1s h o w st h ed i ﬀerences in market thickness and customer satisfaction in the
two cities:
Hospital Location Average no. of transplants/year (1988-96) Patient satisfaction
Apollo Chennai 100-120 High
Willingdon Chennai 100 High
Belle Vue Calcutta 20 Low
Woodlands Calcutta 15 Low
What is more interesting is that following the passage of The Transplantation of
Human Organs Act, 1994, regulating transplants in the country, it has become more
diﬃcult to get permission in the South for non local patients causing a shift towards
22getting transplanted in their nearest locality. This increased demand has been also
matched by increases in the level of quality service provided by the above two cen-
ters in Calcutta which has recently seen high turnover coupled with higher patient
satisfaction. In fact, this increased demand has caused another center (Wockhardt
Medical & Research Centre) to start doing kidney transplants in Calcutta, clearly
showing how markets are responding to demand. It is diﬃcult to identify a fac-
tor which systematically explains this which is why we think that our multiplicity
explanation is convincing.
3 The Service sector: Taxicabs at day and night.
An interesting phenomena that has been observed is the diﬀerent service provided
by taxicabs at day and night at various airports and railway stations. At night, when
traﬃci st h i nc a b st e n dt op r o v i d ep o o rq u a l i t y, cheating customers by overcharging,
taking longer routes and even indulging in outright robbery. At day the service is
noticeably better when the ﬂow of passengers is larger. Passengers, in turn, seem to
respond to this by relying on taxicabs more heavily during the day and less during the
night. This seems to be because the future gains from not cheating is higher at day in
the form of getting more passengers than at night. At night time many more tourists
make arrangements by asking friends and relatives to meet them or even waiting at
the Airport till day before taking a cab. Assuming that the distribution of tourist
types and cab drivers are the same in the day and night this seems a good example
of demand and quality reinforcing each other. Data on the ratio of tourists who use
taxicabs in the day as against those who use it at night should bear this out. Note,
that this seems to be a worldwide phenomenon and attempts are made to deal with
this by having prepaid cab service available at airports and railway stations where a
centralized agency keeps track of passengers assigned to cabs whose license numbers
are noted. (This is based on personal experience, conversations with several people
and newspaper reports, thus no speciﬁcs o u r c ei sc i t e d . )
6.2 Extensions and policy issues
We would also like to extend the model to cover cases where reputation matters and
try to explain promotion and hiring within ﬁrms. Consider diﬀerent tiers of jobs.
Labor starts from the lowest rung (say working at Mc Donald’s at minimum wages),
if they shirk they are dismissed by their employer but they can costlessly enter a
similar job at the lowest rung. If they perform well, they are rewarded by being
assigned jobs in a higher rung next period. Given diﬀering time preferences, there
is an equilibrium with labor employed at diﬀerent rungs. Now consider the eﬀect of
improved monitoring. (say diﬀerent branches of Mc Donald’s can develop a network
to identify past cheats.) In general, the equilibrium ﬂow of people moving to diﬀerent
jobs will now vary. We expect that a society with a similar structure but diﬀerent
information processing environments will have diﬀering levels of welfare-it would be
interesting to study the evolution of a society as it’s information system improves.
23The ability of agents to signal their types and the costs of signalling could also be
important determinants of why such economies could diﬀer.
We think our simple model can be readily modiﬁed to capture the idea that there
are good and bad pockets in an economy and that the transition from one to the
other is often the result of an exogenous change in the environment. The static
lemons model is often used to explain the presence of a suboptimal market size when
increased trade is beneﬁcial to every agent. This model provides a somewhat diﬀerent
justiﬁcation for this inoptimality and provides a dynamic framework showing that a
central authority facing nearly the same informational constraints can do better by
breaking the initial co ordination problem. It can successfully explain transitions
(why a Maﬁa ridden state may re-emerge as a tourist attraction spot following stern
law enforcement) while the static lemons model would predict that informational
constraints will continue to inhibit the market.
A brief policy discussion seems appropriate. This framework suggests that mar-
kets with fairly similar fundamentals can converge to quite diﬀerent steady states.
Thus the question arises about what policies can take the economy out of a ‘bad’
steady state? The obvious answer is changing expectations but it is not quite clear
what that means in real terms.31 It might therefore make sense to talk of ‘small’
changes in parameter value, say a one shot marginal increase in law enforcement.
A temporary change in a parameter value matters because by perturbing expecta-
tions it can take an economy towards a ‘good’ steady state. As a practical matter,
setting up quality certiﬁcation boards would help-if producers have to go through a
quality check they will no longer be able to produce low quality goods removing the
uncertainty that buyers face. Thus buyers would no longer hesitate to come to the
market-eﬀectively once this process starts we would in fact no longer require such
boards-we would have self sustaining system. The market (like a brand name) would
be trusted for its quality products and it would continue to live up to that to main-
tain its future prospects. Thus, in our model quality certiﬁcation boards only have
a temporary role to play. By contrast, the traditional argument that foreign com-
petition would improve quality is not predicted by our model. If anything, matters
can become worse-buyers having the option of switching to a known foreign brand
would leave the existing market reducing market thickness further and worsen the
incentives for sellers to invest in quality.32 A case in study is Russia post-Perestroika
31An interesting possibilty is the use of local currency to signal demand to local investors who
have to decide whether to invest in a costly technology while facing uncertain demand. This is
a possibility suggested by Jayaraman and Oak (2001). However, there are several limitations as
pointed out by the authors themselves. In particular, apart from the credibilty issue of introducing
such currency, for this to work in our set up, consumers must have no uncertainty regarding whether
they want a locally produced good.
32The fact that in a market with imperfect information about quality, late entrants may be
dissuaded from entering if ﬁrms already in the market enjoy a reputation has been recognized before
(see Mayer (1984) and Grossman and Horn (1988)). Thus, it seems natural to believe that a ﬁrm
with an established reputation may capture the market in an environment characterized by imperfect
24when Russians can travel to Europe and acquire good quality second hand cars-the
Russian car industry continues to produce cars of inferior quality.33 Thus, if helping
the domestic industry to grow is an objective, the entry of ﬁrms with established
reputation may be harmful. However, liberalization will make the consumer better
oﬀ (by lowering prices) at the cost of the domestic producer and welfare analysis
is not possible on an a priori basis. This merely points out that the introduction
of foreign competition is not unambiguously beneﬁcial. The evaluation of welfare
requires a general equilibrium analysis which our model does not permit. A policy
prescription which does come out is that any liberalizing policy which allows access
to cheaper technology for producing high quality goods is unambiguously beneﬁcial
as it increases the incentives for producers to invest in quality.
In conclusion, we would like to list the most promising areas for future research.
An important issue is ﬁnding out the conditions for prices to signal quality when low
quality goods also oﬀer some surplus, In Appendix 2 we characterize a separating
equilibrium showing how technologies which involve decreasing costs over time (per-
haps because of ‘learning by doing’) can use prices to eﬀectively separate high good
producers from low good producers, causing market segmentation and resolving the
quality uncertainty. Another area of future research is to study the impact of foreign
competitors in this environment when there is scope for technology diﬀusion. This
needs to be looked at in greater detail, in particular, studying the impact on eas-
ing borrowing constraints and subsidizing producers who adopt this new technology.
Moreover changing conditions are likely to aﬀect perceptions about the future - thus
it maybe worthwhile looking at how δ evolves over time . Another thing we want to
do is explicitly modeling transitions and learning and looking at the eﬀect of exoge-
nous shocks to the system (like better law enforcement, shift of policy from protecting
domestic markets to liberalizing trade). We hope that this simple framework we have
set up will permit such issues to be explored in the future.
Appendix 1 We work out the steady states in detail for the case of more sellers
than buyers . For more buyers than sellers the expressions diﬀer but the analysis is
simpler-we brieﬂy discuss that after working through the various cases for q<1.
Case 1: sl = sh =0







(1 − δh)(1 − a)
information.
33The important thing to note is that here, used cars seem to have better reputation than new
cars, perhaps because the counteracting institutions of the type mentioned by Akerlof (earlier cit.)
may have developed. An empirical study by Bond (1982) notes the absence of a market for lemons
in the used trucks industry. Thus, what is important is not the type of product in question but
whether there are credible ways to signal quality.
25when q<1
(otherwise the steady state equations is simply a
1−a.However in equilibrium q is 0
since x =0and the optimal response is b1 = b2 =0 )
Case 2: sl =0<s h < 1
The steady state ratio is found by equating the ratio of deaths of the two types
to the exogenously given births (or inﬂow).Thus we have
γ((1 − q)(1 − δh)+q((1 − sh)+sh (1 − δh))




N o ww ec a ns o l v ef o rq by looking at the sellers decision problem. For the seller
of type δh t ob er a n d o m i z i n gi tm u s tb et h a th ei si n d i ﬀerent to cheating and being






1 − (1 − q)δh
where the left hand side represents the gains from being honest and the right hand




Substituting in the buyers entry problem we can ﬁnd out the number of buyers who
enter and from that γ and hence sh can be solved. More precisely since S (the total
stock of sellers) is known from q we can calculate n (those buyers who enter in that
period), If n is greater than N (the population of potential buyers) then there is no
solution. If n is less than the type of VH buyers then we calculate the randomization α
s ot h a to n l ynb u y e r se n t e r .A tt h i si tm u s tb et h a tt h e s eb u y e r sa r ei n d i ﬀerent hence
xVH =1giving us the value of x and hence γ.T h u sh2 can be calculated. If n equals
the number of type VH buyers then 1/VH ≤ x<1/VL and hence admissible ranges of
γ and hence sh can be found.(this would correspond to a continuum of equilibria). For
n such that type V2 always enters and type VL is indiﬀerent x can again be precisely
calculated and hence γ and sh can be solved. Finally if n = N then we can again
solve for the admissible ranges of steady states and seller randomizations.
Case 3 :sl =0<s h =1
The steady state equation is given by
γ(1 − δh)










must hold. Now for each q in this range ﬁnd γ and hence x. This gives us the level
of honesty induced by the diﬀerent values of q. (this gives us the sellers response
26curve). Now for each of this x so found ﬁnd the level of q this induces by looking
at the buyers maximization problem, This gives the buyers response curve. If the x
induced by a value of q in turn induces the same q we have an equilibrium point.
Case 4 : 0 <s l <s h =1
With the impatient sellers randomizing the steady state equation is given by
γ(1 − δh)





The value of q is found by equating the gains from honesty and cheating for the




Plugging in the buyers maximization problem we get x and substituting these values
in the steady state equation gives us the equilibrium randomization for the seller.
Case 5: sl = sh =1
With both types being honest the steady state becomes
γ(1 − δh)




Note this must induce both types of buyers to enter (since x =1 ,V i > 1 for
i = L,H by assumption ) -with only high quality objects on sale all potential buyers
must ﬁnd it optimal to enter(otherwise they would not be potential buyers!).
When q>1 we know that sellers behavior is independent of q.T h u st h e i rc h o i c e
is dependent only on whether pδ > c or the converse. Depending on that each type
of sellers behavior is determined. As there is no more uncertainty about matching we
do not have the part with 1 − q. The analysis is similar except that if s =0for any
type at q ≥ 1 it is always 0.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 :
Proof. Suppose not, This would imply that pδ < c. We have to show that this
cannot be if the gains from cheating are always lower than the gains from honesty.
We can see this from the sellers discounted present value of gains from the two types
of behavior




















w h i c ha g a i ng i v e su spδ > c.
Suﬃciency :Consider the q for which both types of sellers are honest. (This will
always be the case for q ≥ 1 since the condition for honest behavior viz. pδ > c holds
for both i). Thus, x =1which implies both types of buyers enter. Thus apart from
the no trade equilibrium the full honesty equilibrium with full entry holds. For this
w eo fc o u r s er e q u i r et h a tt h eqat which this occurs is not incompatible with the total
number of potential buyers i.e.qS ≤ n.
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n2 :
Proof. Figure 3 makes this quite clear . The ﬁrst intersection on the positive
quadrant is ensured by the given condition. We now need to show at least a second
intersection exists. If the conﬁguration is as shown in ﬁgure 3 it is obvious. Otherwise
by proposition 0 (suﬃcient condition) we know that at q max there is an equilibrium
with full honesty and full entry.
P r o o fo fc o r o l l a r y1 :
Proof. The proof is clear from ﬁgure 3. Given condition 2 x2 must lie to the
left of x∗ and q2 must lie below n2/S . Thus, this gives us the ﬁrst intersection of
the 2 curves beyond the origin. The buyers randomization is got by simply equating
αn2 = q2.(α is the randomization probability of buyers of valuation V2).For the seller
we calculate this from the steady state equation (case 2 ).
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n3 :
Proof. When n ≥ S the analysis is much simpler. Now the sellers’ behavior is
entirely driven by cost conditions and preferences. That is easy to see. Consider the
gains from cheating-that is simply pq (there is no chance of being unmatched so sellers
are driven out from the market after matching and selling the low quality product.
From honesty it is simply
πq
1−δi. Thus, for honesty to be optimal pq ≥
πq
1−δi which
implies that p − pδi ≥ π .T h i s c a n b ew r i t t e n a s pδi ≥ c . This is independent of
q. Thus, cost conditions (which determine proﬁt for a given price p ) and preferences
(δ) entirely determine the behavior of sellers.
To show that the steady state level of honesty rises as market thickness increases
and the inequalities in case 3 hold.
28Proof. The steady state equation is
γ(1 − δh)







= b(q +( 1− q)(1 − δl))
where b is a constant a





1+b(1 − δl + qδl)





(1 + b − bδl + bqδl)2 > 0






(1 + b − bδl + bqδl)3 < 0
justifying the shape of the curve.
Appendix 2 Here, we show that there is no separating equilibrium ( in steady
state) given that the low valued good has some value in trade when both sellers
face the same technology, which has the same unit cost over time. However, we see
that separating equilibria may emerge when cost of technology for individual ﬁrms
decrease over time.
Let V h
H , V l
H ,V h
L, V l
L denote the value of the high good for the high type of buyer,
the value of the low quality good for the high type of buyer, the value of the high
g o o df o rt h el o wt y p ea n dt h ev a l u eo ft h el o wg o o df o rt h el o wt y p er e s p e c t i v e l y .
One of the conditions for a separating equilibrium is that one type of seller prefers
to produce the high type of good and the other the low type and charge separate
prices which reveal that.
WLOG let the impatient seller prefer the low quality good and let that be sold at
ap r i c epl and the high quality at ph .The market thickness for the two goods are qh







which is independent of the discount factor! Hence no separating equilibrium is
29possible, because the seller type who gets less can mimic the other.34
What do we require to have separation? A possibility is where the technology
shows scale economies over time (learning by doing perhaps). Let k denote the scale
factor in the sense that ct = kct+1.
A separating equilibrium is characterized by a sequence of prices of the two goods,
market thickness, costs of production of the two goods. Under the steady state
assumption the conditions this needs to satisfy can be summarized by the following
equations.(We work this for the case of less buyers than sellers-the case with more
buyers as well as where one of the situations involve more buyers than sellers and






























L − pl ≥ V
h
L − ph(ICH)
The ﬁrst condition (ICl) says that for a low discount type of seller the gains
from producing the low quality good and selling it as one outweighs the one period
gain from selling the low quality good as a high quality good (cheating) or from the
present discounted value of selling the high quality good. Similarly (ICh) says the
high discount type prefers to sell a high quality product to cheating or selling a low
quality product forever. The buyer’s incentive constraints are given by (ICH) and
(ICH) which says that high valuation buyers prefer to buy the high quality good at
the going price to a low quality good while low quality buyers prefer to buy the low
quality good. The separating equilibrium is possible because the value of the declining
cost of technology has diﬀerent value to diﬀerent sellers-the value of future gains from
the technology is more to the patient seller. The fact that the low quality good also
has surplus implies that for some prices and market thickness impatient sellers prefer
selling low quality goods at a lower price to making high one period gains from passing
them oﬀ as high quality ones.(We assume of course that the individual rationality
constraints are satisﬁed.). Note, of course, that this just shows the existence of such
prices-we also need to show under what mechanism these would be equilibrium prices.
34This contrasts with the literature on prices signaling quality. Two papers which show separation
and partial separation are Wolinsky (1983) and Bandyopadhyay, Chatterjee and Vasavada(2001).
They also have asymmetric information and sellers who can choose the quality to produce which is
akin to our environment but their results diﬀer considerably as the tradeoﬀsa r es o m e w h a td i ﬀerent.
In particular, the sellers have diﬀerent costs which cause this separation while we allow every seller
access to the same technology.
30This result is robust to prices declining as costs of production in the high technol-
ogy falls. This is because for the seller who adopts the technology for the ﬁrst time
the costs still remain high as there are no spillovers. With spillovers which make cost
decline over time for all producers regardless of whether they adopted this earlier
this no longer holds and there may be an optimal time before everyone switches to
the technology of the ‘high end’ good. Studying the eﬀects of such spillovers on the
evolution of the market is an interesting area for future research.
We note that this does not in any way rule out multiple equilibria - this separating
equilibria is one of various possible equilibria.
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